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Abstract
We study the eﬀects of competitive preferences, where Chief Executive Oﬃcers
(CEOs) compare their wage to the wage of other CEOs within the same industry,
and derive utility from being ahead of them. We show that such social concerns
work in the direction of CEO wages being positively correlated, in contrast to the
Relative Performance Evaluation hypothesis, but consistent with several empirical
studies.
1 Introduction
A large recent literature attempts to test the basic hypotheses from agency theory. One
strand of this literature has tested a corollary of the Informativeness Principle1 known
as the Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) hypothesis. The idea behind the RPE
hypothesis is that if firms in the same industry face some common random shock, like
changes in industry demand, an optimal compensation contract for a CEO makes the
payment conditional on the relative performance of the firm (in addition to its absolute
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1The Informativeness Principle (Holmström, 1982) states that an optimal contract should condition
pay on any variable that is (incrementally) informative about the agent’s actions.
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performance); the higher the profit of the other firms, the lower the reward of the CEO
(see Prendergast, 1999, and Gibbons and Waldman, 1999). The ”fine” associated with a
higher performance by others eliminates the impact of factors that are unrelated to the
agent’s eﬀort from the incentive scheme. In the empirical literature, researchers tend to
be puzzled by the lack of evidence for RPE in the CEO compensation data. For example,
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) note that ”relative performance evaluation considerations
are not incorporated into executive compensation contracts” (page 104). And, Murphy
(1999, page 40) states that ”.. the paucity of RPE in options and other components of
executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding”.
The purpose of the present paper is to put forward a behavioral explanation for the
RPE Puzzle. We rely on the human tendency to compare outcomes with other indi-
viduals, and to derive additional utility from out performing others. Several economists
have incorporated such social concerns in their analysis of wage and consumption data
(Duesenberry, 1949, Easterlin, 1974, and Frank, 1985). There is also some empirical and
experimental evidence for the relevance of relative payoﬀ (Clark and Oswald, 1996, Zizzo
and Oswald, 2001). The general idea of the paper is that if CEOs care not only about
their own wage, but also about the comparison with the wages of other CEOs, then the
incentive scheme that firms provide to their manager will depend on the performance of
the managers who are included in their manager’s reference group.
To study the impact of such status concerns on managerial compensation, we use a
simple principal agent framework in which firms consist of one risk averse manager (the
CEO) and a risk neutral principal. The manager’s eﬀort is unobserved and wages are
paid based on their output, which is a noisy measure of their eﬀort. The output of a firm
depends on managerial eﬀort, and its profits are independent of the output of the other
firms in the industry. However, each CEO’s utility may depend on the wage of the other
CEOs in the same industry.
Our main finding is that conditioning the wage positively on the other managers’
output reduces the eﬀort exerted by these managers and also provides insurance against
the added risk generated by the random shocks to the salary of other managers. This
result is in contrast to comparative payments based on a positive correlation in the random
shocks, where wages depend negatively on the output of other managers, but consistent
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with empirical evidence that finds little evidence of RPE in the compensation data. More
precisely, we show that the eﬀects of competitive preferences work in the opposite direction
on compensation schemes as the RPE eﬀect, and hence may explain the lack of RPE eﬀects
in compensation data.2
Other specifications of social preferences, such as fairness and reciprocity may lead
to similar results to the ones we obtain here. Our companion paper, Fershtman et. al.
(2002), discusses the relation between competitive preferences and these other forms of
social preferences in more detail.3
2 The Model
Consider an economy with a large number of firms. The economy is split into n competitive
’industries’, where each industry consists of two firms. Firms are run by managers and
we assume that there are fewer managers than firms. Firms oﬀer potential managers a
wage contract and managers choose in which firm to work depending on the contracts
oﬀered by the firms. There is a free mobility of managers between firms and no entry or
exit costs for firms.
The output of a manager, denoted by yi, depends only on his own actions. We let
yi = ei+εi; where ei denotes his eﬀort, and εi is an iid random shock, normally distributed
with E(εi) = 0 and E(ε2i ) = σ
2. Each firm’s output is equal to its manager’s output. We
let v(ei) = e2i /2 be the cost of eﬀort for the manager.
Firms do not observe managerial eﬀort and thus contracts may depend only on the
realized output of the two managers in the industry. Consider two firms in the same
industry denoted by i and j oﬀering wages wi and wj, respectively. We assume that
managers have competitive preferences and they care not only about their own wage, but
2Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) argue that principals will design managerial incentive contracts to
dampen competition in product markets, and may therefore condition a manager’s wage positively on the
wage of the other managers in the industry. Hvide (2002) argues that relative performance components,
i.e., bonuses that depend on market share, will induce a high managerial risk taking, and a low level of
eﬀort, and hence may not be included in an optimal incentive scheme. Fershtman et al. (2002) consider
the implications of competitive concerns on the organization of work in firms.
3Recent surveys on the experimental and theoretical literature on reciprocity are Fehr and Schmidt
(2000) and Sobel (2001). Charness and Rabin (2001) attempt to identify experimentally the separate
roles of reciprocity, fairness and inequality aversion.
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also about the diﬀerence in wage from the other manager in the same industry. Their
utility function is assumed to be
Ui(wi, wj, ei;β) = −e−αxi, i = 1, 2, (1)
where α is the risk aversion parameter and
xi = wi + β(wi − wj)− e2i /2. (2)
Assuming further that εi is normally distributed, one obtains a certainty equivalent,
whereby the expected utility E(Ui(xi)) is monotone increasing in E(xi)−
ασ2xi
2
.
The term (wi − wj) can be seen as a measure of the status of manager i, while β is a
measure of the intensity of manager i’s competitive (or status) preferences.4 The linear
specification of competitive preferences, whereby manager i gains utility from being ahead
of manager j at a constant rate, β, is quite restrictive and adopted mainly for simplicity.
In general, one would expect competition to be more intense when the wage diﬀerence
between the two managers is small. The term ”industry” in our model serves only as
a point of reference for status comparisons that influence the managerial compensation
oﬀered by firms. The assumption that the outputs of the managers of the two firms are
independent is also restrictive but allows us to highlight the role of social interactions.
That is, wages may depend on output of the other firm in the industry because the relative
wage is important for managers.5
We assume linear contracts of the form,
wi(yi, yj) = si + aiyi + biyj. (3)
4We do not associate any moral value to the attribute of ”being competitive”. In particular having
such preferences implies, among other, the willingness to suﬀer a reduction of income providing that
others will have an even greater reduction. Indeed, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) found that around 65% of
respondents agreed to sacrifice 25 cents of their own income to reduce the income of their peers by $1.
5Fershtman et al. (2002) discuss an alternative specification, where the reference is other workers
in the same firm. That specification involves ”local status” within firms, which the firm can influence
through creating contract asymmetry and wage inequality. De la Croix (1994) surveys the role of wage
comparisons and interdependent preferences in the context of union bargaining.
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Given the wage scheme, manager i chooses the eﬀort level,
eopti = max(ai + β(ai − bj), 0). (4)
The term bj enters manager i0s eﬀort decision since by changing his eﬀort manager i
aﬀects the wage of manager j. Given his competitive preferences, manager i would prefer
that manager j receive lower wages.
Given this wage contract, σ2xi is given by
σ2xi = σ
2[(ai(1 + β)− βbj)2 + (bi(1 + β)− ajβ)2], (5)
which is independent of the eﬀort levels. The first term in (5) represents the variability of
the utility of manager i resulting from the variability of his own output, and the second
term represents the variability of the utility of manager i resulting from the variability of
the output of the other manager.
If binding contracts on eﬀort and wages could be enforced, the firm would provide
perfect insurance and managers would agree to provide the first best level of eﬀort, as
under risk neutrality. However, because eﬀort is not contractible, the optimal contract
maximizes expected utility with respect to the contractual parameters. Thus, we obtain a
second best contract that trades oﬀ the incentive for eﬀort against the need for insurance.
Firms are assumed to be risk neutral and their expected profits are given by their
expected output minus the expected wage they provide to their manager, i.e.,
E(πi) = ei(1− ai)− ejbi − si. (6)
Firms compete for managers by oﬀering contracts that specify (si, ai, bi).
Equilibrium in this model consists of wage contracts w∗i (yi, yj), w
∗
j (yi, yj) and eﬀort
levels e∗i and e
∗
j such that
1. The wage contracts w∗i (yi, yj), w
∗
j (yi, yj) are a Nash equilibrium between the two
firms in each industry.
2. Managers cannot benefit from moving to another firm and accepting its contract.
3. Potential entrants cannot oﬀer a contract that may attract managers and gain
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positive profits.
3 Equilibrium wages and incentives
Due to the interdependence of preferences, we must solve for an equilibrium that deter-
mines simultaneously the contracts oﬀered by the two firms in each industry.
Firm i solves the following problem
max
ai,bi,si
E(πi) (7)
s.t. E(Ui) ≥ U0i,
eopti = max(ai + β(ai − bj), 0),
eoptj = max(aj + β(aj − bi), 0).
where U0i is the reservation utility of manager i. The principal of firm i takes the contract
of manager j, i.e., (aj, bj, sj) as given. Firm j solves the mirror image of firm i’s problem,
with j replacing i, and takes (ai, bi, si) as given.
Because the moment generating function of the Normal Distribution has the form
E(etx) = exp{µt + 1
2
σ2t2}, (8)
we can choose t = −α, set U0i = −e−αri, and rewrite the program as
Max
ai,bi,si
E(πi) = ei(1− ai)− biej − si, (9)
s.t. E(xi)−
ασ2xi
2
≥ ri,
E(xi) = (1 + β)(aiei + biej + si)− β(ajej + bjei + sj)− e2i /2,
ei = max(ai + β(ai − bj), 0),
ej = max(aj + β(aj − bi), 0),
σ2xi = σ
2[(ai(1 + β)− βbj)2 + (bi(1 + β)− ajβ)2].
In the optimum, the participation constraint must hold as an equality. We can thus solve
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for si from the participation constraint and substitute it into the firm’s expected profit
so that the maximization problem of the firm becomes
Max
ai,bi
Vi = (1 + β)ei − β(sj + ajej + bjei)− 1
2
e2i (10)
−α
2
σ2[(ai(1 + β)− βbj)2 + (bi(1 + β)− ajβ)2]− ri
s.t.
ei = Max{ai + β(ai − bj), 0},
ej = Max{aj + β(aj − bi), 0}.
where Vi ≡ (1 + β)E(π). In an interior solution with ei, ej > 0 , we can diﬀerentiate with
respect to ai and bi and obtain,
∂Vi
∂ai
= [(1 + β)− βbj − ei]∂ei
∂ai
− ασ2(1 + β)(ai(1 + β)− βbj). (11)
∂Vi
∂bi
= −ajβ∂ej
∂bi
− ασ2(1 + β)(bi(1 + β)− ajβ). (12)
Substituting
∂ei
∂ai
= 1 + β,
∂ej
∂bi
= −β and ei = eopti we obtain,
∂Vi
∂ai
1
1 + β
= (1 + β)− βbj − (ai + β(ai − bj))− ασ2(ai(1 + β)− βbj) (13)
= 1 + β + ασ2βbj − ai(1 + β)(1 + ασ2).
Note that second derivative with respect to ai is negative. Setting this first order condition
equal to zero and solving, we obtain the optimal choice for ai,
a∗i =
β(1 + ασ2bj) + 1
(1 + ασ2)(1 + β)
. (14)
Similarly,
∂Vi
∂bi
= β2aj − ασ2(1 + β)(bi(1 + β)− βaj). (15)
Implying that
b∗i =
(β2 + ασ2β(1 + β))
(1 + β)2ασ2
aj. (16)
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Firm j solves the mirror image of this problem, and hence,
b∗j =
(β2 + ασ2β(1 + β))
(1 + β)2ασ2
ai. (17)
We can write the reaction functions of the two firms in the form
a∗i =
1
1 + ασ2
+ Abj, (18)
b∗j = Bai,
where
A =
βασ2
(1 + ασ2)(1 + β)
, (19)
B =
(β2 + ασ2β(1 + β))
(1 + β)2ασ2
.
In a Nash equilibrium between the two firms, a∗i and b
∗
j must be best responses against
each other, as indicated by the intersection of the two linear reactions curves in Figure 1
below.6
6The figure is drawn for the case α = σ = β = 1. The equilibrium values of the incentives are a = .61,
b = .47, with an implied eﬀort e = .77.
8
Figure 1: Determination of Nash Equilibrium
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We now see the strategic interaction between the firms. Firm i raises ai as bj rises,
because an increase in bj makes it more costly for manager i to exert eﬀort. The added
cost is the increased wage of manager j, which manager i resents. To oﬀset this eﬀect,
firm i is forced to raise its reward for the eﬀort of manager i. Similarly, firm j chooses a
higher bj when firm i selects a higher ai, because it then induces the manager of firm i to
moderate his eﬀort, which is beneficial to manager j.
It is easy to show for a given risk factor, ασ2, an increase in the degree of competi-
tiveness β shifts the reaction curve for ai as a function of bj upwards, while the reaction
curve for bi as a function of aj shifts downwards. This implies that incentives become
sharper when managers are more competitive.
Using the symmetry of the problem, we can equate ai = aj = a and bi = bj = b and
obtain
a =
1
1 + ασ2
1
1−AB, (20)
b =
1
1 + ασ2
B
1− AB. (21)
We see that
AB =
β3(1 + ασ2) + β2ασ2
(1 + ασ2)(1 + β)3
< 1. (22)
It thus follows that there is a unique intersection of the two reaction curves, which is in
the positive region for a and b. However, this solution is an equilibrium only if the implied
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eﬀort level is positive i.e.,
e = a(1 + β)− bβ (23)
=
1
1 + ασ2
1 + β
1− AB −
1
1 + ασ2
βB
1− AB
=
1
1 + ασ2
1 + β − βB
1−AB > 0,
or
B <
1 + β
β
. (24)
Condition (24) is equivalent to
β3
(1 + β)(1 + 2β)
< ασ2, (25)
which implies the existence of some positive and increasing function β = f(ασ2) such
that eﬀort is positive if and only if β < f(ασ2).
Proposition 1 If the risk factor ασ2 is suﬃciently large relative to the competitive con-
cern β such that condition (25) holds then the unique Nash equilibrium is
a∗ =
1
1 + ασ2
+ Ab∗,
b∗ = Ba∗,
where
A =
βασ2
(1 + ασ2)(1 + β)
,
B =
(β2 + ασ2β(1 + β))
(1 + β)2ασ2
.
If condition (25) does not hold then the unique equilibrium is one in which eﬀort levels
are zero. That is,
e∗ = max((1 + β)a∗ − βb∗, 0). (26)
Note that the solution for the equilibrium incentives and the implied eﬀort of the
managers are independent of the reservation values of the managers. This result reflects
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the fact that the expected utility of the managers can be transformed into a linear form
in wages implying transferable utility between the manager and the firm. To close the
model, we use the free entry condition and set the expected profits to zero, yielding in an
interior solution
s∗ = e∗(1− a∗ − b∗). (27)
We can then substitute this value of s∗ into the expected utility of each manager to get
the common reservation value r∗.
There are two special cases that merit further attention;
(i) For β = 0, we get a =
1
1 + ασ2
, b = 0, and e =
1
1 + ασ2
.
That is, when there are no competitive preferences there is no need to condition
manager i’s wages on the performance of manager j. This is irrelevant information in such
a case that may only contribute to increase the variance of manager i’s compensation.
(ii) If either risk or risk aversion are zero so that ασ2 = 0, then the only possible
equilibria are with ei = ej = 0. If ei > 0, then for any bj, ai = 1. Similarly, if ej > 0 then
aj = 1. But each of the firms will increase their b until the eﬀort of the opponent manager
drops to zero.
We thus see that some degree of uncertainty is required to have an equilibrium with
positive eﬀort. Uncertainty makes it costly to condition the wage of the CEO on the
performance of others, and limits the competition among firms that would drive eﬀort to
zero. This explains the need for condition (25).
The main result of this paper is that with risk and competitive preferences the wages
of managers in the same industry are positively linked.
Proposition 2 For any β > 0, the wage for agent i is increasing in the wage of agent j.
The basic reason for a positive interaction in wages is that conditioning the wage of
one manager on the other’s eﬀort causes the other manager to moderate his eﬀort. The
presence of risk makes such linking costly because it also raises the variance in wages by
adding another risk element into the variance of wages. The optimal contract is based on
a compromise between these two oﬀsetting considerations. Note, however, that even in
the absence of any impact on the other manager’s eﬀort, firm i would select a positive bi.
11
The reason for this result is that a positive incentive for eﬀort for manager j in the form
of a positive aj, implies that the utility of manager i depends on εj. This creates status
shocks to manager i. To alleviate this variability in status, the wage of manager i can be
made to depend positively on the output of manager j. In fact, if firm i cannot aﬀect ej,
it will set bi =
β
1 + b
aj so as to reduce the second term in (5) to 0 and provide agent i
with full insurance against the random shocks εj.
Proposition 2 is in contrast to the Relative Performance Hypothesis, which says
that i’s wages depend negatively on the output of his coworker, because high output of
the comanager indicates that luck (rather than eﬀort) influences i’s output (Prendergast,
1999, and Gibbons and Waldman, 1999).
We may ask whether this equilibrium is eﬃcient, i.e., whether it is possible to improve
welfare by coordinating on decreasing or increasing eﬀort (i.e., weaken or strengthen in-
centives). There are two sources of ineﬃciency in this model. One source of ineﬃciency
is the principal agent problem, reflecting informational constrains. The other source are
the externalities that agents impose on each other, when each seeks to outdo the other,
although at the end they all receive the same reward. Accordingly, there are several stan-
dards of eﬃciency that one may consider here. The first standard is the one that would
exist if the principal agent problem could be eliminated, say by making the manager the
residual owner. The second standard is the case with a principal agent problem, but
where the externalities associated with excessive competition are eliminated by coordi-
nation across firms. Finally, we may consider the case without status externalities and
no principal-agent problem. Of these, the most natural experiment is to consider the
constrained eﬃcient outcome, where the planner faces the same informational diﬃculties
as the firms.
In the constrained eﬃcient case, the socially optimal solution is esb =
1
1 + ασ2
. This
solution requires each firm to trade oﬀ risk and eﬀort, but eliminates the externality
arising from status seeking. If the two firms in an industry can coordinate, they will both
oﬀer a wage contract that mitigates the desire of their managers to compete for status,
when none can be created. Specifically, they could oﬀer the contract a =
1
1 + ασ2
1
1 + β
and b = 0 so that both managers would behave as if they do not care about status. If
there is no agency problem and no externalities, the first best is to set the eﬀort of all
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agents to efb = 1, because then the marginal social value of eﬀort equals its marginal cost.
However, if the manager is the residual owner so that there is no principal agent problem,
but status concerns are present, the uncoordinated outcome would be enc = 1 + β. In
this case, each manager selects his eﬀort taking the eﬀort of the others as given and the
marginal reward for his eﬀort is 1 + β. Note that variance in the wage in this case is
independent of eﬀort.
In the uncoordinated rat race, which arises when managers are the residual owners,
eﬀort rises in the degree of competitiveness as measured by β. In contrast, eﬀort is inde-
pendent of status concerns when coordination is possible, either in the second or first best
outcome. The equilibrium pattern is that eﬀort tends to initially rise with the competitive
concerns β and then decline towards zero. This reflect the way in which the firms (princi-
pals) intervene in the process. At low value of β firms oﬀer weak incentives for eﬀort, but
as managers become more competitive incentives become sharper and firms raise both a
and b. The stronger incentives have countervailing eﬀects on eﬀort, and eventually, the
attempt to discourage the eﬀort of the managers of the competing firm dominates.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that managerial competitive preferences may lead to managerial wages
being positively correlated within an industry. Our main point is that the competitive
eﬀect runs counter to the RPE eﬀect, and hence we have provided an explanation of the
lack of RPE in compensation data. Whether the eﬀect on incentives due to preferences
being competitive is suﬃciently strong to neutralize the RPE eﬀect in reality is an empir-
ical question. However, it is plausible that social interaction rises with proximity, so that
workers in the same firm or industry are more likely to care about their relative wages.
Viewed from this perspective, the surprising finding of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), that
RPE works better for managers that are far apart provides some further support to the
relevance of social concerns.
We may also relate our model to the extensive use of stocks and options in manager
compensation (options alone comprise 35-40% of CEO compensation in the US, according
to Murphy 1999). The use of these compensation instruments is rather puzzling, since
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stock price is a coarse instrument for measuring managerial success; one issue is of course
whether managers can aﬀect firm performance much by doing a better job, another issue
is that such options tend to reward pure luck (i.e., positive demand or factor shock
like decreased oil price) and hence increases the variability of wages unnecessary. The
key here is that although stock prices for individual firms are highly variable, they are
normally strongly correlated within an industry. Hence, if firm j uses options in the CEO
compensation package then it can be optimal for firm i to use options as well, since it
insulates manager i from status shocks. This argument can explain why firms use options
in the compensation package even if the use of options greatly increases variability of the
wage for manager i (and being relatively weakly related to managerial ’eﬀort’).
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